Europe's dependence on Russian gas imports has been the subject of increasing political concern after gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, security of gas supply has been high on the political agenda in Europe. Gas import dependence of the European OECD bloc will increase from 45% in 2006 to 69% in 2030, according to the IEA (2008) Reference Scenario. Russia plays a crucial role, given that it already supplies more than half of Europe's gas imports and that it has the largest proven natural gas 1. In this paper, the terms Europe and European refer to the EU-27 plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, unless indicated otherwise.
2. It should be noted that the relation between Russia and Europe is very different from the relation between Russia and its neighboring states, which, before the price increase, were receiving gas from Russia at prices below netback parity. In addition, it is suspected that Russia's price increases in neighboring states are a prelude to deregulation of Russia's domestic gas market, which currently also has below-market prices. Both considerations imply Russia had understandable reasons for raising prices to its neighbors. On the other hand, Russian gas prices for Europe in 2006 were already in line with the prices in the middle column of Table 1 , which made Europe a profitable and important customer for Russia. Given that, in addition, Gazprom was trying to enter the downstream European gas market, Russia was unlikely to act in the same way towards Europe as it did towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, as a result of the Ukrainian gas crises, European politicians and gas consumers clearly started questioning the reliability of Russia as a gas supplier. reserves in the world (BP, 2008) .
1 This has been a source of increasing political concern, especially since 2006, when Russian gas export monopolist Gazprom launched an effort to increase the gas prices paid by Russia's neighboring states, as shown in Table 1 .
The price conflict in Ukraine sparked strong political reactions in Europe, because it led to interruptions of gas supplies to Europe in the beginning of 2006 and 2009. Energy supply security and in particular the potential unreliability of Russian gas imports became an important topic at EU summits and G8 meetings, and in bilateral discussions with Russia. After the second conflict in January 2009, Czech Prime Minister Topolanek -then President of the European Council -even stated explicitly that "the EU must weaken its dependence on Russian gas imports" (IHT, Jan 28, 2009 This paper provides an economic perspective on Russia's strategic position in the European gas market by answering the following two research questions:
1. What is the potential impact of Russian unreliability on the European gas market, and how does this affect European gas import decisions? 2. To what extent should Europe invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of potential Russian unreliability?
3. Nordhaus (1974) also investigates import taxes, but it turns out that storage is the most specific response to supply security concerns. In this paper, storage shall therefore be used as the exemplification of a broader range of policy measures (e.g. import taxes, rationing, subsidies for renewable energy, etc.).
4. Note in particular that an analysis of long-term contracts is not considered inconsistent with noncooperative modeling. On the contrary, Boots et al. (2004) also use (non-cooperative) Cournot-Nash modeling, which they justify by writing "competition can be expected to take place through quantities, since long-term take-or-pay contracts still prevail in the natural gas market" (Boots et al., 2004, p.74) .
5. However, unlike this paper, the models of Boots et al. (2004) and Golombek et al. (1995 Golombek et al. ( , 1998 ) analyze a segmentation of the European market, based on country and/or type of consumer and/or season. Our paper has only one aggregate demand curve. Note that Holz et al. (2008) , as an exception, use non-linear demand curves.
Russian gas exports, they use a comprehensive numerical dynamic spatial equilibrium model to study the global supply chain repercussions of a scenario in which Russia withholds roughly one third of its gas supplies to Europe during a four-month period. Hartley and Medlock (2009) model the interruption as a deterministic shock with exogenous size. In contrast, in our model, the size of the shock is endogenous, and more importantly, there is uncertainty as to whether the shock will occur. Our model provides an analytical study of how the anticipation of a possible shock -in other words, the perception of unreliability -alters strategic decisions. Our methodology for modeling unreliability is taken from the pioneering paper by Nordhaus (1974) , who analyzes oil supply interruptions using a model with two regimes: a normal regime and a supply interruption regime, each with its probability. Like Nordhaus (1974) , we investigate the option of investing in storage capacity. 3 However, in addition, our model analyzes the contrast between an unreliable supplier and a reliable competitive fringe. In this setting, gas import contracts with the reliable competitive fringe and investments in storage capacity are (imperfect) substitutes.
Since our paper studies long-term gas import contracts, there are similarities with the literature that deals with these contracts (such as Boucher et al., 1987, and Neuhoff and and with the 'hold-up' literature, such as Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004) . However, an important difference between the approach in this paper and the approach of Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004) or Ikonnikova and Zwart (2009) is that the latter two papers use cooperative game theory and explicitly model the negotiation/bargaining between the various parties. Our paper, in contrast, describes the gas market in a non-cooperative setting with quantity competition, following the seminal work of Mathiesen et al. (1987) , several well-known analyses such as Golombek et al. (1995 Golombek et al. ( , 1998 , Boots et al. (2004) and more recent work such as Holz et al. (2008) and Lise et al. (2008). 4 Most of this literature considers European consumers as price-takers with linear demand, which is also the approach taken in this paper.
5
On a broader microeconomic level, the analysis of this paper fits into the literature on differentiated competition. Indeed, as will be shown in Section 3, the contrast of a potentially unreliable gas import supplier (in this case: Russia) 6. A case of elastic domestic supply is discussed in Annex E. 7. For the sake of simplicity, our model does not go to the level of individual end-consumers such as households, industrial users and power generators. Therefore, the term , as we will compute it CS based on demand curve (1), is in fact the importer surplus. In practice, this surplus is somehow divided into importers' profits on the one hand and end-consumer surplus on the other hand. We will not make that distinction, since it depends on market power and regulation in individual countries. We will simply refer to as 'consumer surplus.' CS and a set of reliable import suppliers (in this case: the competitive fringe of other non-European import suppliers), results in a market structure similar to differentiated competition. Singh and Vives (1984) for example, compare Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated duopoly, while Gaudet and Moreaux (1990) do the same for the particular case of nonrenewable natural resources. The main contribution of our paper is that it introduces the notion of unreliability directly into the market structure of the European gas market.
MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET

European Demand, Domestic Supply, and Objective Function
Europe is modeled as a large number of uncoordinated gas consumers and domestic gas producers, with an overarching government that can decide to invest public funds in gas storage capacity. We assume Europe is a price-taker with a linear long-run inverse demand curve for gas:
European domestic producers supply an exogenous and fixed 6 quantity , and q D the remaining excess demand needs to be satisfied by non-European imq‫מ‬q D ports. Short-run demand is also linear, but with a steeper slope :
SR SR
with p*, q* representing the long-run equilibrium. We assume that decisions on long-term gas import contracts and publicly financed strategic storage capacity investments are based on a combination of the interests of importers, end-consumers, domestic producers and taxpayers. We therefore assume that Europe maximizes the expected total 'European surplus' :
where is the consumer surplus, 7 represents the profits of domestic pro-CS P D ducers, and is the public expenditure on gas storage capacity investments. G represents the interests of the recipients of marginal expenditures out of ‫מ‬G general government revenue. Note that equation (3) assumes risk-neutrality. Annex D deals with the case of European risk aversion.
8. This fairly standard model of industrial organization is described in multiple textbooks, e.g. Carlton and Perloff (2000, Chapter 4) .
9. Hence, is exogenous, and there is perfect and complete information about it. The rationale d for exogeneity of is that Russia's decision-makers are also aware of the potential unreliability of d the Russian state, and that they do not have full control over Russia's image of unreliability, nor over Russia's actual behavior over the entire period for which gas contracts are signed. For instance, although Russia never cut gas supplies to Europe during the Ukrainian gas conflicts, the conflict nevertheless led to an increased perception of unreliability in Europe. As we will see later, our model shows that if Russia had full control over its unreliability, it would be optimal for Russia to be perfectly reliable (
). Since we want to study the effects of increased unreliability (whether it is pursued d‫0ס‬ deliberately or not), we make exogenous. In Section 5, we mention a different approach which d could lead to an endogenous . d
Non-European Gas Import Suppliers
Excess demand needs to be satisfied by signing long-term import contracts with non-European import suppliers. We assume that the non-European import suppliers have a dominant firm -competitive fringe structure.
8 Russia is the 'dominant firm' and the other non-European gas import suppliers are grouped together as the 'competitive fringe. ' Russia is modeled as a monolithic entity, i.e. the Russian state is not distinguished from the gas exporter Gazprom. Russia is assumed to be a riskneutral profit maximizer. Russia is modeled to be unreliable: once the long-term contracts have been signed, there is a probability that Russia temporarily does d not comply with its supply commitments, i.e. Russia 'defaults.' Conversely, there is a probability that Russia complies with its long-term contracts during (1‫מ‬d) the entire period. All participants know the parameter upfront.
9 Russia's longd run marginal costs of production are assumed constant at .
c R The competitive fringe is a diversified set of current or potential future non-European gas import suppliers, including both pipeline and LNG supplies. Therefore, we assume that -as a group -the competitive fringe is reliable: even if Russia defaults, the competitive fringe delivers the originally promised contract quantity at the originally promised contract price . This requires two asq p 0 0
sumptions. First, we assume that the long-term gas import contracts between Europe and the competitive fringe are not indexed on any gas spot market price, which would rise sharply in the event of Russian default. In practice, this condition is fulfilled since most current long-term gas import contracts contain little or no indexation on gas spot market prices. Second, we assume that the competitive fringe players do not deviate from their contracts. This is a major assumption, which can be justified by the difference in scale between Russia and each of the other non-European import suppliers. Each of the other non-European import suppliers has much less incentive to be unreliable because the market impact of each of them is much smaller. In addition, a supplier who is perceived as unreliable could face the threat of being replaced by another supplier in the long term. Russia, on the other hand, is hard to replace completely in the long term, even if it behaves unreliably.
10. One could imagine offering interruptible contracts to industrial consumers at a discount. We will not consider that option in this paper.
11. Note that, while certain parts of the transportation cost can be estimated reasonably well (e.g. LNG shipping from overseas suppliers to Europe), transportation sometimes relies on transit countries (e.g. Ukraine), which leads to additional complexity. For example, explicitly study the strategic considerations involved in gas transport from Russia to Europe via transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. While these considerations are important, our paper focuses on the strategic interaction between Europe and its import suppliers. We use OME (2002) estimates of the transit fees.
As we will see below in Section 2.3, the reliability of the competitive fringe does not mean that -in the event of Russian default -there would be price discrimination between end-consumers of Russian gas and end-consumers of gas from the competitive fringe. There will be only one single end-consumer price.
10 However, the rents that result from the compliance of the competitive fringe in the event of Russian default accrue to European importers. Therefore, the most important implication of our assumption is that these rents are part of the European surplus function in equation (3), and are not part of the profits of S the competitive fringe. As for costs, we assume that the long-run marginal cost curve of the competitive fringe is linearly increasing:
(with the c ‫ם‬d0 0 0 0 volume of long-term gas import contracts supplied by the competitive fringe, and , positive constants).
The above-mentioned long-run marginal cost functions (i.e. for Rusc R sia, and for the competitive fringe) include not only production costs, c ‫ם‬d q
but also transportation costs. The calibration for the numerical simulations of Section 4 will take this into account. 11 Finally, since this paper analyzes the gas market on an aggregated European level and does not model gas delivery to endconsumers, distribution costs are irrelevant.
Structure of the Game
The interaction between Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe, is modeled as a game in three stages. Figure 1 explains the different stages of the game. In a nutshell: in Stage 1, Europe decides how much to invest in strategic gas storage capacity; Stage 2 is the stage in which Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and the competitive fringe; Stage 3 consists in the execution of the long-term gas import contracts, in which Russia may or may not comply with the long-term contracts it has signed. We represent the imported gas quantities by (Russia complies with long-term contracts), (Russia 
Execution of contracts
Europe decides construction of strategic gas storage capacity q S
Probability
(1 -δ ) Probability δ 'Nature' decides whether Russia defaults or not (i.e., this is a probabilistic event)
Case 2 -Russia 'defaults':
• Russia delivers
• Competitive fringe delivers q 0 'Dominant firm -competitive fringe' game, with Europe as price-taker:
-Russia (dominant firm) decides to promise gas contract quantity q R,1
-Competitive fringe decides to promise gas contract quantity q 0 -Europe's inverse demand curves determine gas contract prices maximization problem can be translated into demand functions for Russian and other long-term gas import contracts, by finding -for given long-term gas contract prices -the optimal long-term gas contract quantities that maximize Europe's expected surplus in Stage 3. As for Russia, its expected profits in Stage 3 E [ S] are either or , depending on whether Russia complies with
its long-term contracts or not. Therefore, in the 'dominant firm -competitive fringe' game in Stage 2, dominant firm Russia sets the optimal gas contract quantity to maximize its expected profits in Stage 3, taking into account the E[P ] R long-term gas import contract supply curve of the competitive fringe and Europe's above-mentioned demand functions for Russian and other long-term gas import contracts. European demand for long-term gas import contracts will turn out to be differentiated between gas import contracts from Russia and gas import contracts from the competitive fringe, because their effect in Stage 3 is different. The rest of this section describes the three stages in more detail.
In Stage 1, Europe decides to foresee a quantity (in bcm, i.e. billion q S cubic meters) of strategic gas storage capacity, to be used as a buffer in case of withholding of gas supply by Russia. Given the long lead times involved in the development of storage sites, this decision cannot be postponed until it is known whether Russia will comply with its contracts or not (i.e. it cannot wait until Stage 3). Furthermore, in our model, the storage capacity investment decision takes place before decisions are made regarding the amounts of long-term gas imports that are contracted from Russia and the competitive fringe (i.e. before Stage 2). The reason is that investment in storage capacity is a decision that Europe can 12. Note that bcm per year is consistently used for quantities, while EUR / tcm is consistently used for price. The alternative use of bcm and tcm makes the resulting quantity and price numbers conveniently end up in the 0-200 range.
13. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the domestic suppliers have zero cost, hence the shaded area for in Figure 2 extends all the way down to the horizontal axis. A non-zero qʦ [0,q ] D cost would merely constitute a uniform shift of the European surplus function, which would not affect results. make unilaterally. By making the storage capacity investment decision in a separate stage upfront (Stage 1), Europe gives its storage capacity investment decision an advantageous Stackelberg leadership position in the strategic game with its gas import suppliers. In making the decision about storage capacity investment, Europe takes into account the strategic behavior of Stage 2, and it has perfect and complete information to do so.
In Stage 2 Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and with the competitive fringe. Our approach is non-cooperative, with Europe as a price-taker in a 'dominant firm -competitive fringe' model of the long-term gas import contract market. Russia, as the dominant firm, puts a quantity (in bcm q R,1 per year) on the European market, for which it receives a price (in EUR per p R,1 tcm, i.e. EUR per thousand cubic meters).
12 In making its decision, Russia already takes into account the subsequent decision of the competitive fringe, who put a quantity (in bcm per year) on the market, for which they receive a price (in q p Although there are separate inverse demand functions for Russian and other gasresulting from the behavior of importers -the end-consumers face a single price for gas and cannot choose their own mix of reliable and non-reliable gas. There is a single end-consumer price in each of the two states of the world in Stage 3. Stage 3, the final stage of the game, is the execution of the long-term gas import contracts signed in Stage 2. Stage 3 is the stage that results in actual pay-offs for the participants to the game. We study one representative year: although the import contracts and storage capacity investment decisions are longterm decisions that will hold for multiple years, all volumes and monetary payoffs in Stage 3 are shown as annual amounts. In a representative year, there is a probability that Russia honors its commitments, and effectively delivers 1‫מ‬d at a price . This is 'Case 1' (Russia complies with long-term contracts). q p R,1 R,1 Figure 2 illustrates Case 1 graphically. is the gas supply from European doq D mestic producers, which is assumed to be exogenous and fixed (inelastic). The shaded area, , is the European surplus according to equation (3) 
In a representative year, there is also a probability of default, in which d case Russia withholds supply to maximize short-run profits. This is 'Case 2' (Russia defaults), which is depicted in Figure 3 . Assuming that neither nor q D can increase in the short run, Russia can set , for which it can
command a price . Note that this price is derived from the short-run
demand curve (2). Europe responds by cutting consumption and using the maximum amount of stored gas, which is constrained by the storage capacity q S chosen in Stage 1. The storage capacity investment only covers the cost of the storage facility and the capital cost of the unused gas, but not the purchase price of the stored gas itself. The gas withdrawn from the storage will therefore need In the simplest situation, the rent takes the form of windfall profits (or losses) for gas importers. However, more realistically, we can expect that European governments would intervene and take measures that would redistribute the rents (or losses) to end-consumers, e.g. through non-linear tariffs. One example of non-linear tariffs during a Russian default (Case 2), would be a measure that allows all households a rationed share of at a price corresponding to , while the remaining gas q ‫ם‬q p to be replaced for future crises, and we assume that this can be done at some point at a price equal to . Effectively, the price of using gas from the storage p 0 is therefore (in addition to storage capacity costs, which are sunk). The comp 0 petitive fringe always delivers at price , whatever happens in Stage 3. As q p 0 0 before, this does not mean that identical end-consumers would pay different prices in the event of Russian default. Since the marginal unit of gas import supply in the short run in case of Russian default has a cost (because only Russia could p R,2 increase supply), the 'marginal' price for end-consumers should correspond to . While this does create a rent from the fringe supply contracts equal to p R,2 , the rent is part of the European surplus. 14 In total, the European ( p ‫מ‬p ) q R,2 0 0 surplus in case of Russian default is lower than from Figure 2 . Figure 3 shows S 1 , the loss in European surplus due to Russian default. This loss is discussed D S in more detail in equation (8) in the next section.
The three stages of the game represent three distinct decisions. We assume that this three-stage game is played once. In practice, the game is obviously repeated after a number of years, but because the lead times for gas projects are very long, we do not consider the repeated game. Finally, if Russia 'defaults' (probability ), the assumption is that this happens only during a fraction of the d s year. For the remaining fraction of the year, Russia respects and (1‫מ‬s) q p .
R,1 R,1
This is comparable with the approach taken by Hartley and Medlock (2009) In summary, our model describes Russia's unreliability as a potential 'default' event, with a probability of default. 16 The model takes into account d two ways for Europe to escape from the unreliability of Russian gas supplies: on the one hand, diversification by signing long-term contracts with the competitive fringe, and on the other hand, investments in strategic storage capacity. 17 The next section solves the model analytically.
ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
We will now analyze the game described in Section 2 using backward induction. The three stages of the game will therefore be discussed in reverse order.
Stage 3: Execution of Contracts
Stage 3 determines the pay-offs for Europe, Russia and the competitive fringe. There are two possible cases: either Russia complies with the long-term contracts it has signed (Case 1) or Russia 'defaults' (Case 2). We will compute the pay-offs of Europe and Russia in each of these two cases.
Case 1: Russia complies with long-term contracts. In this case, the European surplus in a representative year corresponds to the shaded area in S 1 Figure 2 :
This result is obtained by applying equation ( expenditure on imported gas, taking into account that both Russia and the competitive fringe comply with their contracts. The last term is the yearly storage capacity cost . In this expression, is the yearly constant marginal G‫ס‬ c sq c S S S cost of gas storage capacity, expressed in EUR per tcm per year. One could interpret as the yearly rent to be paid for the storage site. Note that has to G G be paid whether or not the gas is actually withdrawn.
Russia's profits in a representative year in Case 1 are: (2), taking into account the mitigating effect of storage. Annex A derives Russia's optimal quantity and price: 18. This is a special case that leads to insightful analytical expressions. The general case, which is used in the numerical simulations in Section 4, can also be expressed analytically, but the resulting expressions are long and not very insightful. The formulas of the general case are available in Maple format from the corresponding author upon request.
. In Figure 3 , this corresponds to the part of the striped area above the q ‫מ‬q 
Stage 2: Signing Long-Term Gas Import Contracts
In Stage 2, Europe signs long-term gas import contracts with Russia and with the competitive fringe, i.e. the quantities and and the prices and
are determined. In our non-cooperative setting, Russia and the competitive p 0 fringe set quantities to maximize profits while taking into account Europe's inverse demand functions. In our solution procedure, we will first determine the European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import contracts, then determine the non-strategic decisions of the competitive fringe, and finally analyze the actions of 'dominant firm' Russia.
European inverse demand functions for long-term gas import contracts. For given long-term gas import contract prices and , European p p R,1 0 demand for long-term gas import is derived by finding the optimal quantities and that maximize the expected value of European surplus : 
SR functions for differentiated competition: because of Russian unreliability in Stage 3, the long-term gas import contract negotiations involve two differentiated goods, namely long-term gas import contracts with Russia on the one hand, and longterm gas import contracts with the competitive fringe on the other hand. The prices of these two goods can be different. The price obtained by Russia depends not only on the quantity set by Russia, but also on the quantity set by the competitive fringe (and vice versa) . Note that the differentiation applies only at the contracting stage (Stage 2). Once the gas flows (Stage 3), the gas molecules are identical and there is by assumption no more differentiation in the final consumer market. Since , the partial derivatives , , and bϽ0 ‫ץ‬p /‫ץ‬q ‫ץ‬p /‫ץ‬q ‫ץ‬p /‫ץ‬q
in equation (10) short-run price elasticity of demand increases (in absolute terms). | e | SR Non-strategic quantity decision by the competitive fringe. By definition, the competitive fringe behaves non-strategically and supplies long-term gas import contracts to Europe up to the point where the contract price equals the long-run marginal cost of additional long-term gas imports. For the special case 19. This is the standard textbook solution to the 'dominant firm -competitive fringe' model (see e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2000) . First of all, note that there is an implicit assumption that Russia is a Stackelberg price leader vis-à-vis the competitive fringe. An alternative approach would be to have a Nash-Cournot equilibrium between Russia and the competitive fringe. Ulph and Folie (1980) compare the two approaches for the case of oil, and find that the Nash-Cournot approach has the undesirable property that it can lead to an unstable equilibrium in which the dominant firm's profits are lower than under perfect competition. In a slightly different (non-energy) setting, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) show that in duopolistic price leadership games in which firms have capacity constraints, the smaller firm strictly prefers -under a relatively wide range of conditions -to be a follower, as opposed to being the leader or making decisions simultaneously. These results support our assumption that Russia behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the competitive fringe. Secondly, the standard textbook approach mentions an alternative solution, in which a dominant firm with low costs can completely push the competitive fringe out of the market, by setting a price below the 'kink' in the residual demand curve. However, the calibration later in our paper shows that , c Ͻ c (10) equal to the marginal cost . We find: c ‫ם‬d q
4 4 which provides us with the reaction of the competitive fringe as a function of the decision by 'dominant firm' Russia. The procedure for the general case is q R,1 completely analogous.
Quantity decision by 'dominant firm' Russia. The 'dominant firm' Russia faces a residual (inverse) demand function , which is
found by substituting equation (12) in the expression for in equation (10).
Using the residual (inverse) demand function, Russia's expected profits can be expressed as a function of (and ).
Russia chooses a long-term contract quantity to maximize as a mo-
R,1 R nopolist on the residual demand function. 19 For the special case (and hence d‫0ס‬ also ) we find the traditional solution of the 'dominant firm -competitive q ‫0ס‬ S fringe' model:
Stage 1: Storage Investment Decision
Equations (10), (12) and (13) cording to the generalized versions of the equations above. The existence of a unique pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed because our model consists of a set of sequential decisions, each of which is based on a quadratic (concave) pay-off function.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
The parameters of the model are calibrated on cost data and elasticities from the literature, the 2007 baseline for volume, and the average price [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Annex C contains details on the choice of the parameters, while Annex E performs a sensitivity analysis on the elasticities.
Effect of Default Probability d on Long-Term Gas Import Contracts and Pay-Offs
The top half of Figure 4 shows how quantities and prices vary as , the d probability of Russian 'default,' goes from 0 to 1. The graph also shows the discount of long-term gas import contracts offered by Russia com-D p‫ס‬ p ‫מ‬p 
is an 'annualized' amount in the sense of Footnote 15, which means that isR,2 R,2 extrapolated as if the crisis lasts the entire year instead of four months. On the other hand, and S 2 do take into account that the crisis is limited to four months: they contain four months of P R,2 crisis plus eight months of non-crisis.
22. In fact over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] there have been 13 instances of (day-ahead) spot price increases of 40% or more between the closing prices of two consecutive trading days. However, we need to mention that only a very small share of gas volumes is traded on the gas hub spot markets, and liquidity is particularly low on the days with large swings. that the resulting price increase would be around 40% as well. Although substantial, such a price increase is only a two-sigma event over three trading days at gas hubs such as NBP (National Balancing Point, in the UK) when considering a typical daily volatility of 10%. as well as the profits obtained by the competitive fringe. Clearly, Russia's P 0 expected profits decrease monotonically with increasing : the negative impact d of the Russian contract discount and loss of Russian market share is not sufficiently counterbalanced by Russia's increased likelihood of benefiting from a crisis. The only party gaining from increased unreliability is the competitive fringe. The competitive fringe profits increase with increasing , because P d 0 increased Russian unreliability allows them to sell a larger volume at a higher price.
The most important observation is that both Russia and Europe suffer when increases. Although is exogenous in our model, the results show that it d d would be attractive for both Europe and Russia to invest in a more reliable relationship, i.e. lower . d
23. In particular, if the storage site could be set up so that it can be used for seasonal arbitrage while the cushion gas serves as strategic storage, the cost of strategic storage would be significantly reduced. Typical ratios of total gas (working gas plus cushion gas) to working gas are 3-4 for aquifers and depleted reservoirs, hence our choice instead of EUR per tcm per year. c ‫51ס‬ 50 
Conditions for Strategic Gas Storage Capacity Investment q S Ͼ0
In the simulations of Figure 4 , the value of is always found to be 0, q S meaning that it is never interesting for Europe to build any strategic gas storage capacity whatever the value of . The annual cost of storage capacity, d c ‫05ס‬
S
EUR per tcm per year, is too high compared to the potential gains. Figure 5 repeats the simulations with EUR per tcm per year. 23 The result is identical to c ‫51ס‬ S Figure 4 for . For , Russian unreliability is high enough to make dϽ30% dՆ30% investments in strategic gas storage capacity competitive. As of that point, q S (Russia's potential 'monopoly price') drops significantly. As a result, Russia's p R,2 market share loss compared to the competitive fringe slows down slightly, while its discount flattens out. D p Besides lower storage capacity costs , another factor that can encourc S age investments in strategic gas storage capacity, is risk aversion. Annex D explains how our model can take into account European risk aversion, as measured by , the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Typical values of are 2 to 4 for h h financial assets and 10 to 15 when real assets are also included (Palsson, 1996) . corresponds to the risk-neutral case which we have been studying in this h‫0ס‬ paper so far. A what has been observed in Figure 5 . If goes up to 20, then the threshold level h comes down to (point ). However, for EUR per tcm per year, d‫%71ס‬ B c‫05ס‬ S storage remains unattractive, unless , which is highly unrealistic. h k 50
CONCLUSIONS
The first research question of this paper is how Russian unreliability may impact the European gas market and how this affects European gas import decisions. Our numerical simulations show that it is not optimal for Russia to cut gas supplies to Europe completely during a crisis: rather, one can expect Russia to reduce its gas supplies by roughly 40%, thereby temporarily increasing gas prices by roughly 40%. More importantly, the analysis shows that not only Europe but also Russia suffers when Russia's probability of default increases, due to d erosion of its price and market share. These results add weight to the conclusion that the Ukraine incidents probably were not aimed at exploiting monopoly profits from Europe. As observed in Footnote 2, more plausible explanations are a desire to obtain netback parity from neighboring countries, perhaps a prelude to raising prices closer to market levels in Russia itself. Quite possibly, the European per-ception of these crises as expressions of Russian market power has been harmful to the interests of both Europe and Russia.
The second research question of this paper is to what extent Europe should invest in strategic gas storage capacity to mitigate the effects of possible supply withholding by Russia. We find that strategic storage capacity is attractive for Europe only if Russian unreliability is high ( of more than 30%) and storage d capacity costs are reduced by a factor 3 to 4 compared to typical current cost levels. The threshold of 30% default probability is lowered when Europe is assumed to be risk averse.
The results of this paper are obtained using a partial equilibrium model of the market for long-term gas import contracts, with differentiated competition between one potentially unreliable 'dominant firm' (Russia) and a reliable 'competitive fringe' of other non-European import suppliers. Future research could examine the impact of the other suppliers becoming unreliable as well. Another possible extension is to turn our model into a repeated game. In such a game, d could become endogenous as part of a mixed Russian strategy. Finally, the topic of this paper could be placed in a broader comparison of policy measures (import taxes, rationing, interruptible consumer contracts, etc.) that can be used to address gas import challenges.
ANNEX A. OPTIMAL QUANTITY AND PRICE FOR RUSSIA IN CASE OF DEFAULT
This Annex explains equation (7). Russia's annualized profits during the crisis are: derivative of (14) is used: dP ‫ץ‬P ‫ץ‬P dp
Setting (16) and solving together with (15), yields the monopoly quantity and ‫0ס‬ price shown in equations (7). Strictly speaking, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for constrained optimization with constraint should be used. This constraint q Ն0 R,2 is ignored in the analytical presentation of Section 3, but in the numerical simulations of Section 4 it is taken into account, not only for , but also for ,R,2 0 and . Except for , the constraint is never binding. Note that (7) Long-run price elasticity of demand is taken equal to ‫,39.0מ‬ following Golombek et al. (1998) . Short-run price elasticity of demand is determined based on the very comprehensive literature survey of Dahl (1993) . In Dahl (1993) , the average short-run elasticity over the 15 studies that compute both short-run and long-run elasticities is ‫.72.0מ‬
27 In case this value seems large (in absolute terms), one should consider that we are ignoring any elasticity of European domestic supply:
is exogenous and fixed. The number ‫72.0מ‬ should therefore also q D include the effect of a non-zero elasticity of domestic supply. In addition, our model allows Russia to withhold supplies for four months at a time. This means that our short-run price elasticity of demand relates to a time frame of a few months, which makes the value of ‫72.0מ‬ seem reasonable. For the sake of safety, Annex E performs a sensitivity analysis on the elasticities.
According to BP (2008) , total European gas consumption in 2007 was bcm per year. The average German border price as registered by the q ‫494ס‬ (23) is roughly ten times larger than the right-hand side.
35. While this seems quite an extreme stress-test, one can argue that it is justified because longrun elasticity of domestic supply is ignored in this paper. Furthermore, note that a change in q b D requires also a change in to make sure that the new demand curve still passes through the same ␣ calibration point. Secondly, let us double by increasing the long-run elasticity to twice k its original value, while keeping . 35 The results are shown in Figure  e 
